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Within the context of disaster risk reduction, including climate change adaptation, signiﬁcant thematic
discourse has been dedicated to the difﬁculty of implementing research-based knowledge in policy and
practise. Not only has the discussion focused on the causes of this issue, but many recommendations for
enhancing the use of information and knowledge have also been made. The authors ﬁrst frame the
knowledge challenges and, second, introduce a systematic means to identify the factors hindering the
use of information and knowledge. The approach proposed allows determining core barriers in the co-
production, exchange, and use of knowledge. Subsequently, we illustrate where further advancement is
needed in the ﬁeld of knowledge development, means of transmission and use for disaster risk reduction.
We suggest a method that analyses cases considering the success or failure of information ﬂows from and
to different stakeholder groups. The aim is to identify causes for knowledge fragmentation at different
phases in the disaster management continuum, and, subsequently, to strengthen both individual and
institutional learning, as well as to determine social and functional changes required to address pressing
issues of disaster risk reduction, including climate change adaptation, in a competent manner.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In general, increasing knowledge of natural hazard-related risk
and its relation to changes over time (e.g. through the impact of
climate change or land use dynamics) ultimately leads to better
understanding, improved management, and ﬁnally to risk reduc-
tion and adaptation. However, knowledge is unique to a person's
mind and is often confused with information, which is merely a
means of documenting and sharing knowledge. The rapid increase
in research-based knowledge has led to an increased fragmenta-
tion of knowledge. Knowledge fragmentation has advantages in
that it means that advanced, specialised expertise in various ﬁelds
exists. However, linking and aggregating state-of-the-art knowl-
edge, as well as the targeted provision of knowledge for evidence-
based, informed decision-making is insufﬁcient. This is reﬂected
by the immense enlargement of disaster-related research and the
increase of scientiﬁc activities that have so far had limited impactLtd. This is an open access article u
(R. Spiekermann).on reversing the upward trend in disaster damage, precisely ex-
pressed by White et al. [1] as “knowing better and losing even
more”. Obviously, there are gaps: between what is known about
disaster risks, on the one hand, and how research ﬁndings are
translated into policies and programmes, on the other; differences
in understanding what households and communities consider to
be disaster events and appreciating locally developed coping and
prevention measures.
Today, a huge variety of information resources and knowledge
systems with regard to the assessment and management of nat-
ural hazards attempt to increase the uptake of knowledge: gov-
ernmental programmes and research projects, academic journals
and public reports, research institutes and advanced technology,
all supported by scientists, private companies, practitioners, and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from various ﬁelds. Ad-
ditionally, there is the vast knowledge related to the experience of
communities, families and individuals that is not always capita-
lised on. A differentiated view on the knowledge production and
sharing processes can facilitate an increased use of knowledge for
improved disaster risk reduction (DRR), including climate change
adaptation (CCA). As climate change is understood to be one drivernder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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changes, climate change adaptation is integrated into disaster risk
reduction as a contributing factor [2]. For this reason, when the
term DRR is used here, it always includes CCA.
This in turn points towards the production of information and
use of knowledge and raises the possibility that progress is being
blocked by barriers: How does risk-related research-based
knowledge relate to the apparent growing toll of losses? Is human
knowledge and understanding of the causes of the losses in-
adequate despite the increasing research effort, or is it that ex-
isting knowledge is not applied or not used effectively? Is it that
communication methods are inadequate for the task and that in-
formation transferred is not transformed into knowledge that can
be acted on? The synthesis of these latter questions points to yet
another problem: information may be available, but this does not
necessarily imply that it is known, accepted and acted on. The
diverse distribution of disaster risk-related knowledge can lead to
good decision making by some, unfavourable decision-making by
others. And we are often not sure how to characterise good deci-
sion-making as the long-term consequences of decisions are most
often unknown.
Although a growing literature on ‘knowledge-to-action’ has
been addressing the gap between the scientiﬁc community and
the policy community from different perspectives e.g., [3–8], only
punctual efforts have been undertaken to study the gap between
risk interpretation and action [9]. Many aspects of the complex
interface between information sharing, knowledge-making and
decision-making are still unexplored and better appraisal is nee-
ded to effectively integrate information, knowledge, and expertise
into the efforts directed at DRR, in particular with regard to me-
chanisms for positive exchange between science, policy, practise,
and the public.
The current focus on the knowledge gap between science and
policy needs to lead to an increased understanding on how bar-
riers in knowledge implementation can be identiﬁed and over-
come. An increase of research-based knowledge is not as sig-
niﬁcant as improving mechanisms for its increased application.
Our ﬁndings show that barriers to knowledge sharing, transfor-
mation and implementation are generally greater than the means
to overcome them. Understanding knowledge, its production, and
use is very central in this process, as the aim is to implement
knowledge in policy and practise by all stakeholders involved in
DRR. Identifying where fragmentation of knowledge exists, as well
as its causes, represents a primary aim of this study. Or, as Hayek
[10] stated, the challenge is to understand how to utilise “knowl-
edge which is not given to anyone in its totality”. This is not only
true for DRR, but is equally essential for CCA, a process growing in
signiﬁcance and recognition of its importance in the public arena.
For this reason, it is important that synergies between DRR and
CCA are identiﬁed so that identical or similar objectives are ap-
proached in a common effort.
The main objectives here are to explore the complex interac-
tion of knowledge, decision-making, and implementation, and to
understand and identify what hinders the use of knowledge to
make appropriate decisions for risk mitigation. The ﬁrst section of
this paper shows how a differentiated view on information and
various types of knowledge can facilitate improved decision-
making. The second section discusses current deﬁcits in knowl-
edge production in the ﬁelds of DRR and delineates current chal-
lenges for both science and policy. We ﬁnally introduce an analysis
tool, aiming to support the assessment of the knowledge pro-
duction, sharing and implementation process, and in complement,
a rapid interpretation system that visualises where information is
(not) reaching target stakeholders and being acted on. A case
study of the 2013 ﬂood event in Salzburg, Austria, will provide a
concrete example of how barriers can be reduced and overcome toenhance disaster risk management in the public sector, and how
these can be rapidly visualised. Additionally, a case study in
southern Mexico provides evidence on how a DRR initiative may
not work if effective communication and knowledge exchange
between decision-makers and disaster-affected people is not
given.2. Is reframing knowledge a solution?
It is important to understand the nature of knowledge. In so
doing, understanding of knowledge production processes, the co-
existence of different types of knowledge, and the causes hinder-
ing the transfer and use of information that can increase knowl-
edge can be improved. Questions raised by Mittelstrass [11] illus-
trate that in a society where information technology has paved the
way for an evolving information society, knowledge is increasingly
being replaced and confused with providing information, which
may remain untapped or unused, thus legitimising a discussion on
data, information, knowledge, and wisdom: “From knowledge to
wisdom? Which wisdom could that be, if its concept of knowledge
is only that of information again?” [11, p. 22].
A closer look at what knowledge is can improve understanding
of the intrinsic barriers within the knowledge process itself. Hor-
rigan [12, p. 75] describes this process as follows: “Knowing al-
ways involves a knower knowing something. It involves a re-
lationship between a knower and the known. It is an act which
joins a mind with an object in a relationship which is unique and
incomparable with any other. There is no such thing as knowledge
without something known and a knowing subject knowing it.
Each and every act of knowing is a synthesis of object and subject.”
At ﬁrst, this description may seem utterly plausible. However, two
major preconditions are required of the knower: awareness of the
knowable object, and an incentive or willingness by the subject to
be open to receiving or obtaining and understanding the knowable
object, which is at that point the act of knowledge, or cognition.
The known is thus appropriated by the knower so that (depending
on the form of knowledge) it is understood and applicable, either
through the use of this acquired knowledge in concrete actions or
as guidance for decision-making. In this relationship between the
object and subject, good communication is intrinsically important;
it implies not simply transmission of information but information
reception, understanding and action, or if one chooses, inaction,
and which in either case has become the basis of an informed
decision, constituting knowledge, for better or for worse, rather
than one based on lack of information or knowledge. Knowledge
may be lost through inability to express the known or the lack of
capacity to understand the known.
According to Aristotle [13], three forms of knowledge may be
distinguished depending on its telos, i.e., the purpose it serves:
theoretical, productive, and practical knowledge. Theoretical, or
speculative knowledge, is the pursuit of truth by means of con-
templation for its own sake, i.e., because it fulﬁls the intellect. The
purpose of productive knowledge is to know how to produce
something. Practical knowledge relates to action, and is the ne-
cessary ingredient for making correct decisions, though prudence,
the ability to correctly apply knowledge, is presupposed. This type
of knowledge is of great importance in the context of DRR. Prac-
tical knowledge is such knowledge, which is used, or can be used,
given the circumstances, and has an effect in a decision-making
context. Based on Aristotle's Metaphysics [13, 981b1], practical
knowledge amounts to experience, or “knowledge of particulars”,
whereas theoretical knowledge is of universals. A decision-maker
without experience will likely face many difﬁculties, not knowing
how to apply theories; but a decision-maker with great experience
might be capable of producing good results. Yet, the one who has
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derlying experience, the “why”, and is therefore said to be wiser
than the one with only experience. The best decision-maker is one
who has theoretical knowledge as well as experience, i.e. knowl-
edge of universals and of how to apply them to particulars:
“Clearly then wisdom is knowledge about certain causes and
principles” [13, 982a1].
Younkins [14] describes Aristotle's understanding of spec-
ulative knowledge as the result of science, which generates “uni-
versal truths deduced from self-evident principles known by in-
duction. The goal of speculative science is knowledge for its own
sake. Mathematics and metaphysics would be speculative sciences
for Aristotle”. Generally, practical knowledge must presuppose and
employ speculative knowledge to some degree. This is because all
thinking presupposes knowledge of certain principles (such as the
principle of non-contradiction). To illustrate this more clearly, one
may consider that in order to be able to think about individual
things, one must know that there are individual things, and that
names/words denote speciﬁc kinds of things. This is the principle
of identity of which Aristotle states: “If, however, [deﬁnitions]
were not limited but one were to say that the word has an inﬁnite
number of meanings, obviously reasoning would be impossible;
for not to have one meaning is to have no meaning, and if words
have no meaning reasoning with other people, and indeed with
oneself has been annihilated; for it is impossible to think of any-
thing if we do not think of one thing” [13, 1006b1]. In order to
discuss how to reduce disaster risk, one must know what the risk
is and all it entails. Though this knowledge is gained from ex-
perience, it is abstracted from it, because the term ‘risk’ does not
refer to any particular one, but embraces all. This knowledge of
essences is speculative, according to Aristotle.
Other authors [11,15] distinguish between information knowl-
edge (or factual knowledge) and orientation knowledge in a way
similar to Aristotle's distinction between speculative knowledge
and practical knowledge. Mittelstrass [11, p. 22] deﬁnes informa-
tion knowledge as “knowledge of facts, that is, knowledge of what
is the case. Orientation knowledge (or ‘Socratic knowledge’), by
contrast, may be deﬁned as knowledge of aims and purposes, i.e.,
as knowledge of what (justiﬁably) ought to be the case”. In-
formation knowledge is thus of the causes, effects and means; it is
the knowledge, which sciences and technology, given a particular
purpose, may provide. Marotzki [16] further outlines that humans
acquire and grow in understanding of the things of the world via
instrumental, factual knowledge, and with the help of orientation
knowledge they stand in a reﬂective relationship to it. This per-
spective is of great signiﬁcance in order to understand DRR- and
CCA-related decision-making of individuals, organisations, and
society as a whole, as given circumstances and values need to be
taken into account. The issues raised during evacuation procedures
in the Xangsane typhoon event of Vietnam illustrate this use of
knowledge [17]. Although the local population was well aware of
the risks, the elderly did not want to leave their homes as it was
unacceptable to die in another place. Even if a public decision-
maker has sufﬁcient facts on hazard-related issues available, one
must have an agreed vision for the community to know in what
direction to take action.
Understanding of knowledge appears to differ substantially in
various scientiﬁc disciplines. Although similar to practical knowl-
edge, the notion of knowledge according to the sociologist Stehr
[18, p. 263] is deﬁned as the “capacity to act (or capability of taking
action), as the possibility of ‘setting something in motion’.
Knowledge is a model for reality. Thus, for example, social statis-
tics are not necessarily (only) a reﬂection of social reality, but ra-
ther an explication of its problems; they refer to that which could
be, and in this sense they confer the capability of taking action.
Findings are not mere passive knowledge. Knowledge should beunderstood as the ﬁrst step toward action; knowledge is in a po-
sition to change reality. Knowledge enriches human ability.”
Stehr's theory does not quite ﬁt with the philosophical theories of
Aristotle, Horrigan and Bordat, as persons generally have the
“capacity to act” before they have the knowledge. Our capacity to
act exists apart from the knowledge; that capacity is not a part of
knowledge, but a part of us. Instead, it may be said that knowledge
makes us capable of acting in a rational manner. According to
Aristotle [13, 1046b20], the power to act does not imply the power
to act well, whereas the power to act well implies the power to act.
Knowledge thus gives a person not the power to act, but increases
a person's capacity to make appropriate decisions.
Furthermore, the example by Stehr considers social statistics to
not merely reﬂect a social reality, but much more explicate in-
herent social problems by referring to which action ought to be
taken. Stehr therefore considers the statistics as a form of
knowledge, i.e. a “model for reality” [18, p. 263]. But social sta-
tistics are not knowledge but a collection of data, i.e., information.
Their signiﬁcance or meaning requires an intellect, and the re-
cognition of this meaning constitutes knowledge. This meaning
can be identiﬁed with Horrigan's “knowable object”; it is potential
knowledge and when it is known it becomes actual knowledge. In
addition, knowledge of the meaning of statistical data of itself
cannot give an “explication of its problems” or “refer to that which
could be”. These things require knowledge of how things should
be (the ideal) or could be (the range of possibilities), for which
knowledge of the essences of the things concerned are necessary
(which is speculative knowledge). As an example, if one knows the
essence of a certain plant, one knows what is good for it, i.e., the
suitable climatic conditions, soil, nutrients etc. This can also be
paraphrased in the terms used by Bordat [15] by saying that
knowledge of the meaning of statistical data is the ‘Ver-
fügungswissen’ (i.e., information knowledge: the way things are),
and in order to know how things should or could be, one requires
‘Orientierungswissen’ (i.e., orientation knowledge). Orientation and
information knowledge might correspond to Aristotle's spec-
ulative knowledge and practical knowledge, respectively.
An additional form of knowledge that is relevant to the DRR
context and cannot be assigned to the speciﬁc types discussed
above is that gained by experience. Such knowledge is not ac-
quired by information received from an external source, but rather
from lessons learned and one's own personal experience. To il-
lustrate this point, one may consider an emergency relief manager,
who on the one hand constantly receives and provides informa-
tion. On the other hand, this person's action can be based on in-
tuition and on previous experience, knowledge, and capacity. Po-
lanyi [19, p. 4] describes this form of human knowledge by ac-
knowledging “the fact that we can know more than we can tell”.
This represents a different kind of knowledge, a hidden, implicit or
silent knowledge, called tacit knowledge [19]. It remains widely
unknown how to transfer this type of knowledge and make it
useful to others. Personal experiences, and the knowledge gained
by such experiences, lead to behavioural changes that allow the
person to act almost without reﬂection on what needs to be done,
i.e., instinctively. This knowledge accumulation is very complex
and somewhat different to the knowledge discussed previously
and is typical for traditional societies where indigenous knowl-
edge is the result of daily interaction and a long history of learning
within their local environment.
The examples illustrate the need to combine understanding
from multiple knowledge sources when conducting research as
well as when taking decisions. Personal knowledge is related to
the dilemma of individual knowledge versus the knowledge of
groups of people and society, and has been subject to discussion in
the past. Even though the thoughts of Hayek [10] revolved around
the use of knowledge in economics, many ideas are also relevant
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from personal experiences and unplanned circumstances can be of
great value for decision-making and should therefore not be dis-
regarded. On the contrary, every attempt should be made to gather
local and thus personal knowledge born out of personal
experience:
“The answer to our question will therefore largely turn on the
relative importance of the different kinds of knowledge; those more
likely to be at the disposal of particular individuals and those which
we should with greater conﬁdence expect to ﬁnd in the possession of
an authority made up of suitably chosen experts. If it is today widely
assumed that the latter will be in a better position, this is because one
kind of knowledge, namely scientiﬁc knowledge [research-based
knowledge, i.e., knowledge produced by sciences and not knowledge
of science], occupies now so prominent a place in public imagination
that we tend to forget that it is not the only kind that is relevant. […]
Today, it is almost heresy to suggest that scientiﬁc knowledge is not
the sum of all knowledge. But a little reﬂection will show that there is
beyond question a body of very important but unorganised knowl-
edge which cannot possibly be called scientiﬁc in the sense of
knowledge of general rules: the knowledge of the particular circum-
stances of time and place. It is with respect to this that practically
every individual has some advantage over all others because he
possesses unique information of which beneﬁcial use might be made”
[10, H8].
With this differentiated view on knowledge, the examination
by White et al. [1] regarding the situation in which more is lost
while more is known in the context of DRR can be better under-
stood. Although this statement can be misleading, since ‘more
knowledge’ implies there is more to lose, four possible explana-
tions are explored:(1) Knowledge continues to be ﬂawed by areas of ignorance: on
the one hand, available information can be ignored; on the
other hand, ignorance of additional information can prevent
the knowledge base from expanding.(2) Knowledge is available but not used effectively within the
limits of available resources, which refers to the inability or
lack of capacity to implement knowledge in policy and prac-
tise. Reasons for this phenomenon are manifold and can in-
clude the lack of know-how to select the ‘right’ information for
a speciﬁc purpose as well as the unsatisfactory transformation
of existing information and knowledge into practical applica-
tions [20]. Such a view helps understanding why it is relevant
to identify shortcomings, barriers and bridges related to the
exchange and sharing of knowledge among and across differ-
ent societal groups. Weichselgartner and Kasperson [21] re-
lated the paradox of concurrent increases in economic loss and
in disaster-related research to the possibility that existing re-
search-based knowledge is being blocked by fundamental
barriers. This is in line with new international approaches to
bridge that gap through ‘integrated risk governance’ [22].(3) Knowledge is used effectively but takes a long time to have
effect;(4) Knowledge is used effectively in some respects but is over-
whelmed by increases in vulnerability or, in different popula-
tion groups, by discrepancies of wealth, poverty and other
priorities where risk reduction is considered in a holistic
context. Complementing these ﬁndings, scientists argued that
the increase of disaster losses is less a consequence of in-
sufﬁcient knowledge than one of applying the knowledge ef-
fectively, as barriers to the implementation of knowledge often
cause information to be disregarded or not understood by the
intended users. Authors, such as Edgar et al. [23] and McNie
[24], address the issue of “using existing knowledge better”
[23, p. 190]. The problem of the use of existing knowledge isbest explained with an example: The IPCC Fifth Assessment
Report [25] contains a summary of state-of-the-art science-
based knowledge on climate change and its possible impacts
and adaptation needs. From the perspective of a decision-
maker, to use such existing knowledge better, one has to be 1)
aware of the existing knowledge; 2) be motivated to under-
stand and make this knowledge ‘one's own’; and 3) be capable
of applying it effectively through practical applications given
‘local’ constraints.Furthermore, the use of state-of-the-art knowledge, which is
often research-based, has a signiﬁcant time-lag as the ﬁndings
ﬁlter through to all diverse groups of decision-makers, policy ad-
visors and developers. Even if the information available is up-to-
date, scientiﬁcally sound, credible, and salient, the information
must ﬁrst be accepted by the end-user and only then the possi-
bility exists to implement it. Even if deﬁned in policy, a major
discrepancy between policy and practise is no rare occurrence for
the same reason [26]. The acceptance of evidence and information
is a function of values, beliefs, mentality and world views, and
these are often underestimated factors. Such observations under-
line that better appraisal is needed of the actual results at com-
munity and other levels, applying the best available knowledge in
the best possible way, as well as the need to build upon past
achievements and to better integrate information and expertise
into the efforts directed at risk reduction. These issues are well
illustrated in the case study description related to the 2013 Salz-
burg ﬂood (see chapter 5).3. Challenges in disaster risk research
Despite increasing knowledge of the factors contributing to
disaster risk, social intervention in the face of historical climate
variability has not kept pace with the rapid increases in adverse
economic and social effects suffered as a result of a parallel in-
crease in vulnerability and exposure to disasters [27, p. 29]. Recent
research work on DRR has revealed that science, as currently
practiced, is inadequate to meet the challenges of disaster risk [28]
and climate change [29]. One major deﬁcit, for instance, is the
assumption that scientiﬁc knowledge is the primary source of
credible knowledge, which is still central to most literature, thus
overlooking that scientiﬁc knowledge is embedded within larger
systems of knowledge, power, cultural dynamics and context. The
way in which that science was created, validated, or contested as a
knowledge claim is rarely questioned and the normative goals and
values that are ascribed to DRR- and CCA-related concepts are
seldom made explicit [30,31]. More trans-disciplinary research
and decision-support experiments are required when tackling
questions of DRR and a need to apply different modes of knowl-
edge production. Current debates on environmental and risk as-
sessments recognise insufﬁciencies in public participation [32] and
research results demonstrate that power is intimately involved in
mediating the inﬂuence of the policy approach, in both positive
(enabling) and negative (constraining) ways [33]. Recent studies
suggest embracing the “epistemological pluralism” and over-
coming “narrow interdisciplinarity”, for instance by improving the
quality of communication and applying a mixed-methods ap-
proach [34–36].
In mainstream hazard research, institutional and constitutional
constraints are still too often ignored; social resilience and adap-
tive capacities are infrequently investigated and risk education as
speciﬁc strategies of social capacity building is seldom highlighted
[37]. Deﬁcits also exist with regard to practical applications of
conceptual thinking in vulnerability assessment, operational
methodologies relevant for and applicable by practitioners,
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vulnerability, and assessing the substantial costs of implementing
vulnerability reduction strategies [38]. Existent scientiﬁc results
and assessments of risks are frequently not used because they
have been deﬁned and framed to meet the needs of science rather
than the needs of those making decisions including those ad-
dressing the immediate needs of the most vulnerable. Various
studies point to different institutional settings and standards,
differing cultural values, divergent understanding, lack of re-
sources, and mistrust numbered amongst critical factors hindering
efﬁcient transfer of knowledge into action [38–41].
Moreover, present institutional structures are often proving
unable to address or clearly communicate issues related to the
current complex challenges of climate change. Climate science-
society relationships are often much less linear and predictable
than some actors involved tend to assume [42]. While there is a
high degree of scientisation of the climate debate and politicisa-
tion of climate science, the role and actual signiﬁcance of scientiﬁc
knowledge in decision-making is not sufﬁciently understood yet
and certainly not by many civil society actors where uncertainty
prevails. More efforts are required to integrate perception and
social-cultural meanings of climate change and to convert these
research ﬁndings into understandable, targeted and concrete ac-
tions in practical mitigation and adaptation measures [34,43].
Deﬁcits exist with regard to the mitigation of both low prob-
ability and extreme events [17]. Possible chain and potentialFig. 1. Pitfalls of and propositions for research to increase effectiveness. Pitfalls (in r
transferred through the traditional pipeline mode (blue boxes), that is scientists set the
assuming that they diffuse automatically through the policy and practise communities
would result in more socially robust and context-sensitive knowledge within the framew
are explicitly expressed. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure leg
Source: Adapted from 36, p. 327].cascading effects are seldom considered in the hazard assessment
and thus, absent in risk planning and prevention. In particular, lack
of experience and disaster memory result in a lack of a local pre-
vention culture based on existing scientiﬁc, social and technical
knowledge. Equally, scientiﬁc knowledge has been criticised for a
lack of appreciation of local experience and disaster memory. For
example, scientists barely contribute to activities taking place
during the response phase after the hazard event and, in many
cases, research on the issues of vulnerability, mitigation behaviour,
and risk communication is not ranking high on their priority list.
Frequently, research ﬁndings and the arguments of science for DRR
do not ﬁnd their way to key decision-makers. While scientists face
difﬁculties in identifying the adequate responsibilities and legal
mandates in the public sector, the practitioners lack the resources
to acquire high quality and resolution data. Available scientiﬁc
data is often only partly relevant or useful, of poor quality, not
adjusted to the needs of decision-makers (e.g., regarding scale and
resolution), or scattered among many sources. Overall, the fact
that scientists regularly disregard local knowledge while local
actors pay little attention to scientiﬁc data is in part due to the lack
of a shared risk culture and poor exchange and communication
between different actors. Such a gap in understanding of priorities
is a fundamental constraint in addressing DRR in a locally social
and economically viable manner.
Various barriers and bridges hinder and enhance the con-
nectivity between DRR- and CCA-related science, policy, anded) that typically occur when knowledge is designed in academic isolation and
research agenda, do the research, and then transfer the results to potential users,
. Proposed ways (in green) to enhance effectiveness of research-based knowledge
ork of knowledge-brokering, where the research and knowledge needs of end-users
end, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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hance collaboration and partnerships between research, policy-
making, and the public [16]. It is assumed that such mechanisms
have greatest success when (at least) the two-way ﬂow of in-
formation or “inreach” and “outreach” is involved, where cross-
sectoral integration of different kinds of knowledge is enabled, and
mutual learning among different societal actors is emphasised.
Strategies are needed that are capable of integrating the sys-
temic and multi-scale features of DRR and the related decision-
making processes into a holistic concept. Regarding the science
domain, two issues especially require attention: the achievement
of scientiﬁc consensus on the output of scientiﬁc research, and the
assessment and communication of uncertainty. Concerning the
policy domain, attention should be paid to vulnerability, risk- and
climate-related issues, as well as to the governance structures of
decisions. Both domains should enhance their efforts by providing
arenas where knowledge can be shared and jointly discussed, thus
transforming their boundaries into lively interfaces among scien-
tists of different disciplines and stakeholders of all different groups
that promotes feedback and communication veriﬁcation.4. Identifying barriers to knowledge production, sharing, and
implementation
A methodology for analysing fragmentation of knowledge has
been developed by the authors. Two instruments are combined in
a systematic way to identify barriers and bridges of knowledge
production, sharing and implementation. The ﬁrst instrument is
the data-information-knowledge-wisdom (DIKW) framework, i.e.,
the knowledge accumulation process. It is both difﬁcult and de-
cisive to distinguish between data, information, knowledge, and,
ultimately, wisdom. Understanding the relationship between
these is the key for identifying and understanding barriers and
bridges of knowledge production and transfer [44]. This knowl-
edge production process is illustrated by the DIKW web (Fig. 2).
The DIKW framework was initially illustrated by Ackoff [45] as a
pyramid in the ﬁeld of systems analysis oriented toward business
applications. Since then, it was revisited by several authors who
suggested different ways of interpreting and using it [46,47]. TheseFig. 2. The DIKW web.authors understood that there must be several feedback loops in
the data-information-knowledge pyramid. For example, the ability
to select relevant information from an excessive quantity of
available information demands orientation knowledge (the aims
and purposes must be known). Furthermore, Jennex [47] re-
cognises that while data and information are clearly the bricks of
knowledge, productive knowledge is needed to produce data and
information in the ﬁrst place. In this way, knowledge production
becomes more cyclical than linear.
Concerning the DIKW framework, a few issues require further
discussion as the geometric form of a pyramid (linear rather than
cyclical) may be misleading. For this reason, Fig. 2 illustrates the
framework as a web with interweaving bi-directional threads so as
to show that data, information and knowledge are intertwined
more closely than a pyramid can illustrate. In accordance with
perception and context, data is collected to improve under-
standing of a certain reality. Knowing the context in which data is
collected and transformed into information (contextualised, cate-
gorised, calculated, connected and/or condensed) is highly sig-
niﬁcant [46]: why is this data collected? Is sufﬁcient under-
standing and knowledge of the methodology for data acquisition
available (feedback loops between knowledge and data)? For what
purpose is the data being prepared as information (understanding
the use of the data and information)? This requires the data ana-
lyst to not only have a profound understanding of the data itself
(including the limitations), but to be aware of the wider system –
i.e., the DRR methods and objectives. The meaning of the in-
formation is a second issue that must be understood by the person
being informed prior to it becoming actual knowledge. Without
understanding what the information is attempting to convey, in-
cluding the context the information was produced in, the user may
not fully receive the information in the intended way, i.e., the act
of cognition would be imperfect. Only in full understanding of the
knowledge gained can well-reasoned, informed decisions be
made, taking into account possible long-term consequences.
Three further aspects are essentially connected to all elements
within the DIKW web. Insight is an important factor when ac-
quiring and applying data, information and knowledge in the de-
cision-making process. This again requires a profound under-
standing of the processes being considered in the context of the
problem at hand and apprehending the true nature of the
knowledge being used. A further common attribute and essential
criterion linking each instance of the DIKW web, which is required
to ensure the transfer from one state to the next, is the use of
intellect. Although this may appear to be a vague statement, in-
telligence is necessary in order to acquire data in a correct and
accurate manner using state-of-the-art means, as well as produ-
cing information in consideration of the context. Again, the in-
tended meaning of the information may only be received using
intelligence. As an example, information provided to reduce the
level of future ﬂood losses needs to be understood with reference
to this intention, rather than the intention to reduce potential
damage caused by landslides. The third element depicted in Fig. 2
is learning, which extends all the way through the spider web.
Throughout the knowledge production process, learning is intri-
cately associated to each step and may impact the procurement of
data, information and knowledge through feedback loops as un-
derstanding increases with time. The spines of the web can also be
seen as feedback loops returning back from knowledge to data,
which are intended to depict the necessity to take experience re-
turns into account while addressing limitations of DRR. In full
awareness of the meaning of information, informed, insightful
decisions may be made, based on the knowledge gained and the
proper use of intellect. When decisions are made in this way, one
may refer to them as wise decisions, i.e., decisions that produce
good results (useful or beneﬁcial, positive in nature).
Fig. 3. Disaster Risk Reduction Continuum. (For interpretation of the references to
colour in this ﬁgure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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sight, as well as proper use of the intellect and the capacity to
learn, are all uncertain factors within the DIKW-web and inherent
to the decision-making process. Incorrect understanding, lack of
insight, and improper use of intellect may lead to human error and
unwise decisions. For this reason, Eiser et al. [9, p. 6], based on the
report from the International Council for Science [48], underlined
the “need for a better understanding of human decision-making in
the face of risk as a priority for disaster risk reduction” as “dis-
asters cannot be properly understood, or indeed prevented,
without attention to the critical role of human agency and societal
processes”. This statement shows that DRR cannot be separated
from human capital development since these processes are inter-
dependent and must be given equal priority. The institutions of
science and education are especially involved in this process. Often
the incentives for researchers need to be adjusted to include the
development of young scientists as well as policy-relevant re-
search, not simply the quantity of research output.
The second instrument is the disaster management continuum
(DMC). At each stage of the DMC, various stakeholders interact to
produce data, information, and knowledge, and make decisions
based on what, variously, is known (evidence-based), or with little
or no consideration thereof (non-fact-based). The information
produced and the decisions taken during one phase in the DMC
often inﬂuence one or more of the following stages of the DMC.
Both the IPCC-SREX [27] and the strategic goals of the UNISDR
Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) [49] stress the importance of
community involvement, use of local capacities and resources, and
multiple stakeholder involvement in decision-making in order to
improve understanding of disaster risk and planning risk reduc-
tion measures. The DMC can also be used to facilitate the process
of identifying the stakeholders and existing issues of fragmenta-
tion. This can be done by asking the following questions: Who
produces what? Is the data/information/knowledge shared? How
is it shared? Who actually knows what is needed to know in order
to make appropriate decisions, and for whom? And does the
knowledge produced actually lead to DRR? If not, why not?
The DMC is an important tool for evaluating decision-making,
because barriers in risk governance may lead to knowledge frag-
mentation and therefore hinder DRR. By using the DMC to assess a
speciﬁc case study, both bridges supporting and barriers hindering
the use of knowledge for decision-making, can be evaluated. The
DMC cannot be viewed without consideration of former events,
previous policy limitations, and contextual processes and dy-
namics before the inception of any speciﬁc disaster cycle. If done
so, contestations against disaster prevention policies may be
fuelled. In this way, the DMC may be viewed as an open loop or a
continuum, which also considers improvements of disaster risk
management and the impact of CCA. Thus always greater time
periods separate disaster events, the ideal being to break away
from the traditional cycle, which would represent a case where
mitigation measures (both prevention and preparedness) ade-
quately deal with the hazards. The cyclic concept of disaster risk
has led to the development of the notion of a ‘disaster risk con-
tinuum’, taking into consideration the fact that risk is constantly
evolving and changing, requiring an equally constant adaptation
process to risk (Fig. 3).
In a ﬁrst step, stakeholders and their competences involved at
each stage of the DMC are mapped, according to four groups:
scientists, public sector (decision-makers in policy and practise),
private sector and civil society. The organisational structure can be
complex and the actual responsibilities of the various entities and
bodies associated with disaster risk management (DRM) can only
be separated with much difﬁculty. All the more so, when CCA is
differentiated institutionally from DRR, even though synergies in
practise exist. The stakeholders often differ depending on the typeof hazard. Multiple entities are involved with similar activities,
often at different scales and levels, spatial settings or areas of
specialisation. For instance, in Austria, within the public sector
alone, four federal ministries share competences with the pro-
vinces and the local municipalities. The aim is to decipher who is
responsible for what and how the tasks are co-ordinated between
the various entities. The exact delineation of the management
stages is not as crucial as the understanding of who is responsible
for what. To do so, information related to disaster management in
a given case study must be generated by interviewing relevant
experts and stakeholders as well as conducting a comprehensive
literature review, which includes newspaper articles and online
news outlets. The results are classiﬁed according to who (stake-
holders) does/did what before, during, and after a speciﬁc disaster
event. In a second step, these experience reports are analysed
using the Disaster-Knowledge Matrix (DKM) to identify barriers
and bridges in knowledge production and use with regard to the
four stakeholder groups.
Information pertaining to the respective management stages of
the DMC is produced using different data and information as in-
put, and various methodologies. The resulting information and
knowledge gained during a certain phase provides a basis for de-
cisions to be taken by the respective decision-makers and stake-
holders. The decision-makers often differ depending on the ha-
zard, the DMC phase and scale. Furthermore, adaptation to climate
change is primarily integrated within, but not limited to, the
prevention and mitigation phase (e.g., incorporating climate
change scenarios in hazard assessments or vulnerability reduction
measures), as well as the opportunity for adaptation measures
during the recovery phase.
The implementation of knowledge within the disaster risk
management continuum is analysed using the DKM with the
phases of the DMC on the x-axis and the knowledge production
ﬂow, stemming from the DIKW web, on the y-axis (Fig. 4), thus
combining the two tools described. The matrix illustrates how the
experience reports can be systematically analysed, and includes
the various stakeholders as a third dimension. The DKM can be
used as an instrument to identify bridges and barriers of in-
formation and knowledge production and transfer. Each ‘box’ of
the matrix can be assessed individually as well as the relationship
between the boxes. As one particular stakeholder may be re-
sponsible for generating and providing information, another for
transferring that information to other relevant stakeholders, in-
formation may be lost. The grey bars indicate this fragmentation of
information and knowledge. The thin red arrows indicate the ﬂow
of information and knowledge and potential impact of decisions
(e.g., the ‘knowledge output’ of the prevention and mitigation
planning prior to the last event may be a ﬂood risk map, which can
form the basis for preparedness planning). Feedback loops of
knowledge into the generation of data and information (as
Fig. 4. Disaster-Knowledge-Matrix (DKM). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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lationships between the disaster management stages by the hor-
izontal arrow (Fig. 4).
The DKM is a simple schematic representation of knowledge
production and sharing in DRR and due to its linear and static form
cannot fully consider the complexities of real-world situations.
However, the DKM facilitates the identiﬁcation of the most sig-
niﬁcant aspects in dependence on the disaster event being as-
sessed and helps to explain the gaps experienced as it recognises
both DRM and knowledge production as social processes. The
DKM structure integrates two basic and complementary ap-
proaches of the issue, in line with what can be learnt from inter-
national literature. This leads to the question of how to identify
key inﬂuential factors that hinder the co-production of knowledge.
In order to identify the presence or absence of fragmentation of
knowledge and its causes, knowledge gaps, shortcomings and
barriers are categorised and summarised according to their social,
functional, and structural nature [20]. Functional barriers, often
related to resource issues (temporal and monetary), include di-
vergent objectives, needs, scope, priorities, and lack of co-opera-
tion and co-ordination. Structural barriers include different in-
stitutional settings and standards that restrict the collaborative
production and transfer of knowledge across boundaries. Social
barriers include factors such as cultural values, communication,
understanding, and mistrust. Bridges between boundaries can be
categorised in the same way: functional, structural/institutional,
and social. When the objectives, needs, and priorities of re-
searchers and decision-makers are similar and well-co-ordinated,
functional bridges are given. An example for a structural bridge is
an institution that facilitates knowledge relationships between
science, policy, and practise through partnerships, co-production
of knowledge with stakeholders, and a wide range of incentives forresearchers that include policy-relevance and human capital de-
velopment. Social bridges include successful interdisciplinary
work, cultural understanding, international communicative cap-
abilities, and transparency regarding personal agendas in order to
manifest trust. Based on the information provided, it is also pos-
sible to pinpoint knowledge gaps, where additional knowledge
may have helped to improve procedures and to reduce disaster
risk.
For a given case study, the DKM is designed to: a) identify who
the stakeholders are; b) understand where and why fragmentation
issues exist; and c) determine whether or not DRR is a successful
process according to the type of risk(s) initially targeted. The hy-
pothesis is that by completing the DKM, patterns will highlight
what level of the knowledge web was reached. The DKM is only a
model and does not reﬂect reality in its complex entirety. As
Mittelstrass [11, p. 23] recognises, there are no “simple and
straight paths between information, knowledge and wisdom.
Whoever does not recognise this will lose knowledge and end up
not with wisdom, but in a new, and dangerous, form of stupidity”.
The knowledge system within the DMC is much more dynamic
and complex than merely the two dimensions of knowledge on
the one side, and disaster management on the other. Additional
dimensions include the spatial and temporal scales and the level of
decision-making. When completing the DKM, these additional
dimensions need to be considered. The output from a certain stage
of the DMC, e.g., risk maps prepared for preparation planning, can
be strongly challenged by inﬂuential stakeholders, which may lead
to a rejection of the assessment rather than its application and
implementation – again demonstrating feedback loops. Usually,
there is a need or request for information; it is not automatically
transferred, so two-way communication is apparent.
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5.1. Flood event in Salzach River, Austria
High levels of precipitation and antecedent soil moisture in the
Salzach catchment produced a ﬂood discharge with a return per-
iod of about 100 years at the downstream reaches of the Salzach in
June 2013 [50]. The Salzburg City water gauge station measured
8.51 m, 15 cm higher than catastrophic ﬂoods in 2002, which re-
sulted in damage of an estimated three billion Euros for Austria
[51]. Since then, national and regional authorities have invested in
disaster mitigation have been implemented by national and re-
gional authorities. These measures signiﬁcantly reduced damages
along the Salzach during the ﬂood event in 2013. Furthermore, the
hazard zone maps have been updated using state-of-the-art
methodologies for all large waters of the province of Salzburg.
These activities are an example of successful DRM, but improve-
ments are still needed, particularly regarding communication be-
tween various stakeholders and actors in the entire disaster
management continuum. The transfer of information from and
between the hydrological agencies, weather forecast services, to-
wards the media and responders was often unsatisfactory, mis-
leading, or interpreted incorrectly [16]. A thorough analysis of
media reports, supplemented by interviews with responsible de-
cision-makers, and results from a local stakeholder workshop form
the basis for the DKM analysis. The objective is to analyse
knowledge fragmentation during the ﬂood event in order to im-
prove co-ordination and communication. The coloured boxes
highlight where knowledge fragmentation occurred and reﬂects
the reason for it, i.e., whether the barriers of knowledge produc-
tion, transfer and implementation were of social, functional and/or
structural nature.Fig. 5. DKM analysis for the 2013 ﬂood in Salzburg. (For interpretation of the referenceAlthough a post-disaster evaluation of the Salzach ﬂood event
in the province of Salzburg shows that there were far more
achievements than ﬂaws, particularly compared to the ﬂood in
2002, knowledge fragmentation did occur in 2013. An evaluation
enables lessons to be learned and the knowledge acquired to be
included in future disaster risk management strategies. The as-
sessment demonstrates that the interaction between local ad-
ministrators and authorities and research institutions is often very
difﬁcult and viewed with caution (see cell A2 in Fig. 5). Finding
ways for greater collaboration and integrating results from re-
search projects where possible could lead to improved manage-
ment and transparency.
A problem associated with the media and public and related to
methods during the early-warning stage, B2, is that the expecta-
tions towards what meteorologists can deliver have increased
drastically. Highly accurate ﬂood forecasts are now expected two
days in advance. Due to the nature of the rainfall phenomenon
causing the ﬂoods, i.e., the spatial variations of rainfall outbursts, it
was only possible to provide accurate forecasts immediately prior
to the incident, or even as it was happening. The reason for this
lies in the model itself and the limitations of technical capabilities
to accurately forecast the spatial variations of rainfall and conse-
quently the ﬂash ﬂoods in the different catchments, rather than in
the communication between meteorologists and hydrologists
[52,53].
The main shortcoming of the 2013 ﬂood was one of commu-
nication. The information related to the early warning of ﬂoods,
based on current rainfall forecasts by the meteorological service,
issued by the hydrological service was passed on to the media on
Friday afternoon, but only used on Saturday morning for the news
reports, although information updates were being transmitted
hourly all through the night since the accuracy of the informations to colour in this ﬁgure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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creased with time. Furthermore, the hydrological service com-
municated a much more severe event on late Saturday afternoon.
The media, however, delayed the transfer of this information to
the public until Sunday morning. A communication problem that
did exist was thus with the media (B4). The meteorological service
uses trafﬁc-light symbols based on international standards of the
National Weather Service (NWS) to communicate risk of extreme
weather. The orange level had already been communicated. Dur-
ing consultancies with the hydrologist, the prospect of a 100-year
event, i.e., red alert, was considered but then dismissed. Based on
the media reports alone, there is no reason to think that the
communication between meteorological and hydrological services
was inadequate. However, a close scrutiny shows that the message
was clearly misinterpreted. In some parts of the Province of Salz-
burg (e.g., Saalachtal), the ﬁre brigade was also not actively pre-
paring for a large-scale event on Saturday, despite the early
warning they had received. The ﬁre brigade is used to responding
to immediate emergencies rather than preparing in advance based
on 48-h warnings, which reﬂects a lack of guidance for decision-
making.
Media training is given to meteorologists of the meteorological
service, which occurs within the framework of general training
where a media expert attends. According to the meteorological
service, it very much depends on the journalist whether or not the
information provided is transferred successfully. If the journalist
knows from his/her own personal experience how the predicted
event will likely impact the given social environment, he/she can
more readily understand the meaning of the information. These
points all portray a general lack of standards. A further issue is that
the media aims to sell news and can therefore be polemic. In this
case, three statements were cut (one or two sentences taken from
each statement), causing disorientation so that it looked like each
speaker was contradicting the other (B5). By undermining the
importance of the information provided and focusing on in-
dividual priorities, appropriate preparation for the ﬂood is in-
hibited and can lead to inaction by persons at risk. Related to the
response by the provincial emergency centre during the ﬂood
event is the issue that no tangible plan is in place which guides
decision-making in function of the information received (C2).
Furthermore, emergency response teams are not trained to deal
with information (such as the return period of a ﬂood, which is
often not a useful piece of information during an emergency
event) provided well in advance (C4). They are trained to respond
immediately to emergencies that are occurring in the present.
From this, one concludes that the information sent out by state
authorities and meteorological agencies included model un-
certainties and was changing in time, so that it was difﬁcult for the
media to interpret the information correctly, which lead in this
particular case to an underestimation of the risk associated with
the ﬂood. The public media did not always use the early-warning
information about ﬂood risk in a consistent manner and there
were delays in transmission of up to date weather information
that media had received. This generated confusion amongst civil
society who in many instances took no measures to prepare for
the event and potentially reduce damage. Interestingly, there were
inadequate mechanisms to control if information sent out was
received and acted on by the target groups. Positively, however,
there was considerable learning after the event, and this indicates
that the systems and organisations both learned from the ex-
perience and determined to introduce improvements. This case
shows that a detailed evaluation, on the basis of the DKM, can
support the identiﬁcation of knowledge fragmentation and facil-
itates the design of improved risk management. Based on this
analysis, appropriate measures can be developed in order to avoid
similar effects of knowledge fragmentation in future. Since themajor barriers were of functional and social nature, a stakeholder
workshop was organised together with key decision-makers in
practise to discuss achievements and challenges of the 2013 ﬂood
event in Salzburg. Although many of the stakeholders invited re-
late to one another in a functional manner, but strong relation-
ships are often lacking. By improving relationships and trust
among the stakeholder groups, an environment that allows for
improved DRR is established and will contribute to overcoming
the many social and functional obstacles identiﬁed using the DKM.
Additionally, improvements in early-warning procedures are cur-
rently being made and include the establishment of a single
communication channel between the local authorities in charge of
forecasting events and the media to avoid disorientation and
conﬂicting messages in the future.
5.2. Relocation of landslide survivors in Chiapas State, Mexico
The second case study we present is that of the rural town of
Juan de Grijalva, located in the municipality of Ostuacán, Chiapas
(Mexico). In November 2007, a landslide slipped into the Grijalva
River, which subsequently ﬂooded and destroyed the homes of the
people of Juan del Grijalva. 25 people were killed in the small
community of 217 inhabitants. In addition, people from 11 other
settlements were evacuated to the town of Ostuacán. This emer-
gency served as an argument for the relocation that was subse-
quently developed based on the Sustainable Rural Cities (SRC)
model. The SRC programme simultaneously addresses risk man-
agement, the management of rural areas, the population density
needed to combat dispersion (related systematically to margin-
alisation), and the integration of rural producers into regional and
national markets. SRC Nuevo Juan de Grijalva was built in 2008 on
land halfway between its previous location and Ostuacán and in-
augurated in 2009. The new settlement consists of more than 410
houses, and its population includes people from 11 previously
dispersed communities.
Discrepancies between policy and its implementation reveal
barriers between information and knowledge sharing among ac-
tors involved in the decision-making process: public institutions,
the private sector, NGOs, and the relocated residents. Policies were
implemented without adequately consulting those affected, i.e., a
lack of participation in decision-making resulted in signiﬁcant
consequences during the post-disaster relocation.
The location of the settlement has a rugged topography and
does not meet planning criteria, it does not guarantee the opti-
mum potential for construction of the thousand houses that were
initially planned, and of which only 410 were built on 300 m² lots
with constructions of 60 m² each. The relocated families quickly
identiﬁed the disadvantages of the location: strong winds, risk of
erosion and landslides, and little commercial movement. Bene-
ﬁciaries were given titles with a clause stipulating that they cannot
sell the house for at least 25 years, to prevent them from returning
to their previous settlements.
The architects who designed the project two years after the
event only had 48 h to develop the plans. Since the disaster, af-
fected people were living in temporary shelters. These distressed
families were moved into the new houses built in a new town, an
urban environment for rural dwellers. The design had neither
considered the work needs, family lifestyle, nor the size of the
families, and thus modiﬁcations were immediately required. From
the beginning, the inhabitants showed discontent with the design
and materials of the houses. Many homes had leaks and ﬂoods
because the main construction materials had not received a wa-
terproofed ﬁnish. The kitchens, originally located on the sides of
the houses, were not accepted and most people have moved their
kitchens to what was originally the patio. The kitchen is not only a
place for preparing food but also the family gathering area; in that
R. Spiekermann et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 13 (2015) 96–108106sense, setting it to the side was impractical for family culture dy-
namics. In the original proposal of the SRC, kitchens sought to
reduce power consumption, thus stoves were installed which
make use of wood for ﬁreplace thermal efﬁciency and for avoiding
smoke inhalation. However, these proved to be unattractive to
villagers. The reason for this is not in the design of the stoves but
in their spatial arrangement in the house. Moreover, timber re-
sources are further away. Currently, people have to walk 10–15 km
to collect ﬁrewood, or else pay for it. Another related aspect is the
dissatisfaction with the dimensions of the housing. People were
accustomed to modest but spacious buildings with larger outdoor
spaces. The size of the rooms, which are designed for beds, does
not allow for the traditional use of hammocks. This ends up pro-
ducing overcrowding, or else changing of the use of some spaces.
Unable to grow enough in the plots of their new homes, people
expressed the need to return to work their previous land or mi-
grate to larger cities with more opportunities. This resulted in
additional payments for public transport, a considerable number
of hours per week in travel, and the repopulation of the area at
risk. Far from work and livelihood opportunities, some of the fa-
milies returned to their previous home location or used both
places: the old location to work their lands and the resettlement to
live. The objective of the relocation programme, i.e., the resettle-
ment and integration of landslide-affected families in Nuevo Juan
de Grijalva, was not met, since the settlers occupied the new
homes while maintaining some presence in the high-risk area of
the former settlement. The abandonment of the ancient settle-
ment would represent losing a reliable source of income, based on
subsistence agricultural activities in which they have an estab-
lished domain, compared to the SRC production projects, which
are subject to the regional market, lack of skills and unreliable
subsidies.Fig. 6. Information ﬂows in the Chiapas State case. (For interpretation of the referenceUsing the DKM to map the Chiapas State, Mexico case study
highlighted serious failures to consult with the prime stakeholders
about their needs. Importantly, it highlights a common occurrence,
i.e., divergence amongst different stakeholder group priorities and
agendas (e.g., political and ﬁnancial) when determining what form
of risk reduction action should be taken. By adjusting the per-
spective of the DKM, Fig. 6 addresses the stakeholder interaction
to showcase the information ﬂows during various disaster man-
agement phases in order to identify the reasons for difﬁculties
faced. In contrast to the Salzburg case study, the analysis in
Chiapas State focuses on how information/knowledge/wisdom
was used and applied according to the stakeholders involved in
the disaster process and not necessarily in the best interests of the
most vulnerable. Thus, greater detail is given to the context of
decision-making by individuals, groups, and organisations, which
enables a complex problem to be broken down to a level at which
stakeholder-speciﬁc intervention measures can be designed to
strengthen the use of knowledge for decision-making in policy and
practise. In effect, the decisions and actions taken by authorities,
planners, and investors changed the nature of support to the pri-
mary stakeholders, i.e., the inhabitants, and in effect by shifting
family vulnerability away from the previous risks of ﬂoods and
landslides, created new forms of social and economic vulnerability
which caused even more losses to the disaster-affected people.
So the question arises as to how discrepancies between poli-
tical priorities and policy implementation, juxtaposed with the
needs of families affected by the landslide disaster, can be un-
derstood. Policy implementation limitations reveal barriers be-
tween information and knowledge among involved actors and
particularly poor citizen consultation and participation in the de-
cision-making process. As a result of the temporary relocation of
affected families to Ostuacán while the new settlement was beings to colour in this ﬁgure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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process. The population was very brieﬂy consulted for some of the
decisions regarding the new settlement, but those decisions were
carried out in the context of family fatigue related to their refugee
status. For example, the choice of the new settlement was – only in
the ofﬁcial discourse – the “product of negotiations” between the
victims and the state government, which bought the land with
federal funds. Because of time pressure arising from the temporary
dwelling of the families in Ostuacán, the decision resulted in an
improvised and questionable choice. The housing design and al-
location processes integrated the participation of the families only
to a limited extent, including people who had remained two years
in temporary shelters. The relocations were executed as ‘shared
actions’ between the people and the different levels of govern-
ment, however many aspects of the project were decided before-
hand by the lobbying of groups with different private and public
interests. The limited citizen participatory process was a way to
legitimatise the relocation, otherwise what was actually a political
outcome. The red crosses in Fig. 6 indicate a failure to commu-
nicate adequately with the prime concerned social group, the
disaster-affected people. The case highlights the transfer of risk
from the original vulnerability to ﬂoods and landslide, to a new
form of social and economic vulnerability. The case also illustrates
non-participatory ‘assistance’, giving rise to the exclusion of dis-
aster-affected people.6. Conclusion
The nature of knowledge-action is such that informed decisions
can only be made with an intelligent use of available information
and pre-existing knowledge. This requires a constant learning
process, which necessitates an effective application of one's mind
in order to understand context-speciﬁc information and utilise it.
The capacity to learn is dependant on sufﬁcient training and pre-
vious learning, as well as an awareness of current problems and
the availability of accessible, relevant information. The transfer of
knowledge is thus also a function of the individual capacity to gain
knowledge, i.e., to learn, and therefore contains procedural, tech-
nical and cultural components that all need to be considered. The
implementation of knowledge, including decision-making, is de-
pendent on available instruments and the ability to design risk-
reducing means that are knowledge-based, i.e., the capacity to
utilise knowledge gained. To achieve knowledge implementation
requires target-speciﬁc provision of information and incentives for
individuals to acquire the knowledge needed to make well-rea-
soned, evidence-based decisions. Accordingly, knowledge adapta-
tion, i.e. the adjustment of knowledge provision according to user
needs, is an aspect that needs to be integrated into the design of
knowledge management systems.
Although knowledge is steadily increasing, in the sense that
expert and research-based understanding of how to reduce dis-
aster risk has strongly advanced, it is–particularly due to its social
nature – not immediately available to all. The problem related to
knowledge is, therefore, that it is often stored away and difﬁcult to
access. Knowledge is most commonly lost or fragmented due to a
lack of co-ordination, partnership, good and traceable commu-
nication, and sharing of the known. For this reason, decision-ma-
kers and all stakeholders involved in DRR need to reﬂect on their
own capacity to make informed decisions and, in realisation of
individual limitations, seek the lacking information, e.g., drawing
on advice from experts, when essentially necessary. By turning to
a colleague or trusting information from an external source, de-
cision makers enter into a learning process, and will more readily
be capable of gaining knowledge, which one was previously una-
ware of. Increasing incentives and possibilities for decision-makersto gain knowledge in order to improve decision-making is there-
fore imperative.
The (research) gap between knowledge of risk, its interpreta-
tion and action [8] allows us to re-conﬁrm that a lack of knowl-
edge is not the key challenge. The issue related to increasing dis-
aster losses lies much more with risk interpretation and under-
standing, mentalities across scales, power structures, personal
attitudes, values, world views and budget constraints. Greater
emphasis needs to be attributed to the qualities of saliency,
credibility and legitimacy in the science-policy interface. These are
after all prerequisites for acceptance of knowledge. It appears that
the focus on ‘the knowledge gap’ can legitimately be questioned.
This is also the conclusion, which stems from our ﬁndings: social,
structural and functional barriers in knowledge sharing and im-
plementation are currently greater than the capabilities to over-
come them, hindering an effective reduction of disaster risk.
Available risk-related knowledge is not the problem of ineffective
disaster risk management, but lack of knowledge on how to
overcome barriers to implement the knowledge certainly is. One
key barrier is thus the lack of resources to apply knowledge in
practise and a lack of incentives for decision-makers in policy and
practise to continue gaining knowledge for improved, evidence-
based decision-making.
Furthermore, the many facets of knowledge are seldom com-
prehended or distinguished in the context of DRR. This leads to an
increased ignorance, as well as a lack of appreciation and utilisa-
tion of important sources of information and knowledge aimed at
effectively reducing risk. By reframing this problem of knowledge,
in which more is lost while more is known, the focus is once more
drawn towards improving understanding of the knowledge pro-
duction cycle and to identify barriers in an analytical manner in
order to deconstruct obstacles that are systematically leading
to a fragmented use of knowledge. By integrating knowledge
production processes into the disaster management continuum,
barriers and gaps of knowledge action are identiﬁed and subse-
quently combated by designing appropriate, stakeholder-speciﬁc
measures.
Following the generic discussion on current gaps and deﬁcits in
DRR, we suggest means by which research can ensure increased
application and effectiveness of available information and knowl-
edge. The way forward is a more socially robust and context-
sensitive knowledge production, with the integration of (a) local
knowledge, in the sense that tacit and practical knowledge based
on local experience is understood, but also includes an under-
standing of local priorities and perceptions as well as a factual
depiction of user needs, (b) provision of improved, target-oriented
methods of communication, and (c) trans-disciplinary approaches
to research.
To improve DRR, knowledge uptake by all stakeholders in-
volved needs to be increased so that informed decision-making
can take place. Overcoming barriers to knowledge implementation
is considered to be a means to reduce the so-called knowledge gap
in DRR. The DKM introduced offers an analytical tool to illuminate
the causes of knowledge fragmentation and the possibilities to
comprehensively transfer and apply it. The case study of Salzburg,
Austria, illustrates a fundamentally social process, beginning with
the identiﬁcation of all stakeholders involved in dealing with a
speciﬁc ﬂood event, followed by an analysis aimed at evaluating
why problems occurred during the event, to ﬁnally consider
measures to improve local disaster management and counter the
re-occurrence of similar problems. The case study of Chiapas State,
Mexico, illustrates the importance of inclusion in knowledge
production, in knowledge sharing, and the role of trans-dis-
ciplinary approaches to DRR. By shedding light on the use of in-
formation, knowledge, and wisdom, a learning process is initiated
and supported by a clear illustration of where improvements in
R. Spiekermann et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 13 (2015) 96–108108decision-making can be reached. The knowledge gap can be re-
duced by an elaborate confrontation with the nature of knowledge
so that innovative ways to overcome social, functional and in-
stitutional barriers to the production, transfer and application of
knowledge can be identiﬁed.Acknowledgements
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